Nine DHCW programmes compete for shared delivery capacity that cannot satisfy all of them. No programme gets enough resource to succeed; every programme produces some output; none reach the threshold of working software. The commons — engineering capacity, integration time, clinical-engagement bandwidth — is depleted faster than it regenerates. The 0/9 on-time programmes figure is not an anomaly — it is the predictable consequence of treating shared capacity as inexhaustible.
What is the tragedy-of-the-commons trap at DHCW?
The Tragedy of the Commons occurs when multiple users draw from a shared resource, each acting rationally in their own interest, but collectively depleting the resource until it fails everyone. No individual user has an incentive to restrain their consumption.
How It Manifests at DHCW
Nine major programmes compete simultaneously for the same shared delivery capacity — the same pool of staff, the same architecture teams, the same integration specialists, the same testing environments. Each programme director fights for resources. No programme gets enough to succeed. All nine are under Level 3 review.
The current set is at minimum: CANISC, LIMS, RISP, WICIS, EPMA, the NHS Wales App, GP system migration, Cloud Transition, Eye Care (OpenEyes), and Digital Maternity. Two of these — LIMS and RISP — were running concurrently in 2025 with explicit acknowledgement at the Performance and Delivery Committee that the load was producing “significant pressure on resources across NHS Wales.” LIMS itself had been compressed from a four-year programme into two; Michelle Sell, PDC February 2025: “we compressed what would have been a four-year program into two years. And I think we’re seeing some of the consequences of that now.” The compression was a deliberate decision; the consequence was a foreseeable failure.
The shared-resource problem was diagnosed early. At month seven of DHCW’s existence, the architecture team explicitly asked the board for support and prioritisation — the prescription that would have addressed the commons before it deepened. The board agreed “enthusiastically” and did nothing. Doyle, the same year, asked the board to identify “what to stop doing.” No stop list followed. The prescription was offered repeatedly and rejected each time. The commons continued to be drawn from until each programme failed.
The tragedy is compounded by L1: The Hiring Trap. The response to insufficient capacity is to hire more people, but the new hires draw on the same experienced staff for onboarding, further depleting the shared resource.
The tragedy is further compounded by L7: The Competence Void. Even if you concentrated all resources on a single programme, leaders without technology delivery experience would still make poor decisions about that programme. The commons is not just depleted — it is poorly managed.
Produced By
L1: The Hiring Trap — each programme demands more people, but adding people to the shared pool makes it less productive, not more.
How is the tragedy-of-the-commons trap broken?
Ruthless portfolio focus. Pause six programmes. Deliver three. The three must be selected by an independent panel including health board clinicians — not by DHCW leadership, who will prioritise programmes that justify their empire over programmes that deliver clinical value. One-page delivery contracts: scope, deadline, target, consequences.
The blueprint’s Intervention 3: Portfolio Ruthlessness targets this trap directly – cutting nine competing programmes to three gives each survivor enough of the shared resource to actually deliver.